When Homer Simpson says “doh”, you know that something stupid is about to happen. Unfortunately, I believe that the same thing is true about the upcoming Firefox feature called DNS over HTTPS (i.e., DOH). Developers at Firefox noted a real problem: DNS queries aren’t secure. This has been axiomatic for years. That’s why DNS developers created DNSSEC. But DNSSEC is taking forever to roll out. Consequently, the Firefox developers baked Trusted Recursive Resolver (TRR) into Firefox 61. [Note: TRR has been available since Firefox 60. But TRR will move from an experiment to a reality as Firefox 61 rolls out across the Internet.]

Background

One of the key design points of TRR is  the encapsulation of data in a secure transport mechanism. Theoretically, this will limit man-in-the-middle attacks that could compromise your browsing history (or redirect your browser altogether). Of course, theory is not always reality. Yes, SSL/TLS is more secure than plain text. But it is widely used. So it is burdened by the need to retain backward-compatibility. Nevertheless, it is more secure than plain text. And security conscious consumers can implement TRR even if their local DNS provider doesn’t currently offer DNSSEC.

Risk

So why is TRR so risky? That’s simple: Mozilla is implementing TRR with a single recommended resolver: Cloudflare. I don’t think that anyone has an axe to grind with Cloudflare. From all that I have read, Cloudflare has never used customer data exclusively for its own benefit. That’s not true for Google, or OpenDNS, or a lot of other DNS providers. Of course, Cloudflare is a relative newcomer. So their track record is limited. But the real issue is that Mozilla has designed a system with a single point of failure – and a single choke point for logging and control.

Mitigation

Fortunately, Mozilla has enabled changing the TRR mode and TRR URI. Unfortunately, it is currently managed only through the about:config interface. That’s fine for a technician. But it is a dreadful method for end users. I am hopeful that Mozilla will provide a better interface for users. And I certainly hope that it is implemented on an “opt-in” basis. If they don’t, then folks who use their own DNS (e.g., every Pi-hole user) or folks who specify a different public provider than Cloudflare (e.g., Google, OpenDNS, DNS.Watch, etc) will be forced to “touch” every workstation.

Bottom Line:

Is Firefox acting badly? Probably not. After all, they are trying to close a huge DNS hole that infrastructure providers have yet to close (i.e., DNSSEC). Nonetheless, their approach is ham-handed. Mozilla needs to be transparent with the why’s and when’s – and they need to trust their users to “do the right thing.”